Terror management theory (TMT) proposes that all humans subscribe to some form of a cultural worldview, a system of thoughts and beliefs that provide the world and our lives with a sense of lasting meaning. According to TMT (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) , these conceptions of reality serve a vital psychological purpose. Cultural worldviews buffer us from fearful preoccupation with our own impermanence, vulnerability, and mortality. We report two studies that test this hypothesis in a novel way. We used a self-affirmation procedure that encouraged people to affirm an important source of meaning and value in their lives. Then we assessed responses to an overt reminder of mortality. We predicted that affirming one's worldview would reduce defensiveness in response to reminders of one's own certain death.
TMT
TMT, based on the work of Ernest Becker (1971 Becker ( , 1974 Becker ( , 1975 , posits that humans have a vast potential for fear and anxiety. Specifically, sophisticated and uniquely human cognitive abilities have as a cost the acute awareness of one's own vulnerability and inevitable death. This knowledge, combined with an instinct for selfpreservation and a tendency to become anxious when threatened or vulnerable, generates an immense potential for chronic anxiety. This potential for anxiety must be managed if we are to reap the benefits of our sophisticated cognitive abilities.
TMT posits that we manage the potential for debilitating anxiety with a two-part psychological system. One's cultural worldview comprises the first component. This is a shared system of beliefs and values that makes the world meaningful and orderly and permanent, instead of arbitrary and chaotic and ephemeral. Through investment in a worldview, we come to see our behaviors and our place in the world as important and meaningful. For instance, we derive meaning from work, or from family, or from money, or from political ideology, or from religion (e.g., Baumeister, 1991) . And we come to feel that these meaningful components of our cultural fabric are permanent because culture is transmitted from generation to generation, continuing on indefinitely, thus allowing people to be a part of something that transcends their own finite existence.
However, faith in a cultural worldview is not the sole buffer against the potential for existential anxiety. Selfesteem also protects one from the problem of death. According to TMT, we achieve self-esteem by living in ways consistent with the values and standards prescribed by a cultural worldview. We earn, we procreate, we prayand doing so is normally approved by close others and endorsed by society at large. Through self-esteem, we achieve protection from mortality with a kind of symbolic immortality, based on our role in the larger cultural story (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1998) .
TMT researchers have posited that if worldviews and self-esteem function to ward off mortality concerns, then making mortality salient should increase worldview defense and esteem-seeking behavior. Numerous studies have supported this hypothesis and have therefore supported the central tenets of the theory. In a typical study, participants write a few open-ended sentences about the idea of their own death or a control topic. Then they evaluate others who support or challenge their worldview, such as, for American participants, someone who praises or condemns America and its people. The results consistently show that participants made to consider their own mortality show a greater worldview bias. They like the proworldview person more and like the antiworldview person even less than participants in the control condition (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997; Greenberg et al., 1990 Greenberg et al., , 2003 Heine, Harihara, & Niiya, 2002; McGregor et al., 1998) . Thus, because cultural worldviews protect the self from existential concerns, evoking death-related concerns increases the bolstering and defense of those worldviews.
Researchers have further posited that if self-esteem acts as a buffer against death-related concerns, then bolstering self-esteem should eliminate defensiveness instigated by mortality salience (MS). Support for this hypothesis was evident when people given a temporary self-esteem boost did not show the typical defensive reaction to a worldview violator after MS (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997) . Furthermore, the boost to self-esteem reduced the cognitive accessibility of death-related thoughts, suggesting that reduced death accessibility was associated with reduced defensiveness following MS (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997, Study 3).
We sought to advance terror management research by putting the self-protective value of cultural worldviews to the test. We reasoned that insofar as worldviews serve to alleviate anxiety and defensiveness in the psychological encounter with death, bolstering one's worldview should have as a consequence reduced defensiveness in response to mortality salience. If one's worldview is strong, held with conviction and a sense of value, then death-related concerns should be less threatening to one's sense of self. Accordingly, nonexperimental evidence suggests that worldview faith confers equanimity in response to death and existential concerns. Viktor Frankl (1963) , for example, concluded from his experiences as a prisoner in four Nazi concentration camps that a sense of purpose and meaning provides the most powerful protection from suffering and the fear of death. Currently, however, no experimental work has directly demonstrated the effectiveness of bolstering people's values or worldviews in reducing death-related defenses. The present work was directed toward this end.
Self-Affirmation and Terror Management
To test the hypothesis that bolstering people's meaning systems will reduce defensiveness in response to MS, we turned to an experimental method in the social psychological literature that seemed particularly relevantself-affirmation. Developed by Steele and colleagues (Steele, 1988; Steele & Liu, 1983) and elaborated subsequently by Steele and others (e.g., Fein & Spencer, 1997; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Sherman & Cohen, 2002; Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000; Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell, & Beach, 2000) , self-affirmation often entails the explicit affirmation of a characteristic or value that people regard as highly important in their lives. For example, in a common self-affirmation procedure, participants choose a value or characteristic they consider very important and write about why it is important to them. Examples of valued domains used in selfaffirmation include relationships with family and friends, physical attractiveness, and creativity. Affirming the self by affirming one's most important values appears to fit the description of a worldview-bolstering procedure. It leads people to select a central part of their worldview and affirm to themselves its meaningfulness and importance.
Value-based self-affirmations have been shown to reduce defensiveness in a number of situations. For instance, self-affirmation of core values has led people to ruminate less about failure on a purported intelligence test (Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999) and to be less apt to rationalize dissonant behavior by changing attitudes (Steele & Liu, 1983) . Furthermore, and of particular relevance to TMT, selfaffirmation has been shown to increase openness to acknowledging threats to personal health (Sherman et al., 2000) . In the present studies, we considered whether self-affirmation in the form of affirming important values may prevent defensive responding to perhaps the most definitive threat to the self-death.
In the terms of self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) , thinking and writing about core values reduces defensiveness because it satisfies an overarching and basic need for "self-integrity," defined as considering oneself a moral and competent being. When self-integrity is secure, a self is less reactive to ego threats and other challenges to self-integrity. Furthermore, self-affirmation theory posits that self-affirmation processes are flexible, and that affirming one's values is not the only way to secure self-integrity. For example, self-affirmation has also been manipulated by providing people with highly positive feedback, which may have little direct relationship to core values or cultural worldviews. Instead, this type of self-affirmation appears to reduce defensiveness by temporarily boosting self-esteem. In one set of studies, Fein and Spencer (1997) found that state self-esteem was raised by positive but bogus performance feedback (Study 3), and that this feedback reduced evaluative derogation of an outgroup target much like a value-based self-affirmation did (Study 1). Harmon-Jones et al. (1997) also used positive but bogus feedback to boost self-esteem and found that this boost reduced defensiveness triggered by MS.
Thus, self-affirmation is operationalized in different ways, sometimes as a boost to self-esteem and sometimes as a declaration of one's most cherished values. Furthermore, value-based self-affirmation has not been shown to increase self-esteem. For example, two experiments in which participants thought about and ranked their most important values found no reliable changes in state selfesteem as a result (Galinsky, Stone, & Cooper, 2000) . Other studies that have used similar value-affirmation procedures generally have looked for changes in mood, not self-esteem, and the consistent finding is that thinking and writing about values does not improve mood states (e.g., Fein & Spencer, 1997; Spencer, Fein, & Lomore, 2001; Steele & Liu, 1983) . In Steele's (1988) overview of self-affirmation, he rejects the view that mood mediates the effects of affirmation and seems to imply that self-esteem plays little or no role in valuebased self-affirmation effects, though data on this point is lacking. In sum, it appears that the role of self-esteem in self-affirmation may depend on how affirmation is operationalized-whether it is done by focusing people on their values and beliefs or by focusing people on their own worth through positive feedback.
Because we wanted to test the effects of bolstering cultural worldviews on terror management defenses, we used the value-based affirmation procedure. To determine the role of self-esteem in the expected affirmation effects, we carefully monitored participants' self-esteem levels after the affirmation manipulation. We also conducted supplementary studies to explore in detail the effect of value-based self-affirmation on self-esteem. We predicted that affirming one's value priorities would reduce defensiveness in response to reminders of death just as boosted self-esteem has been shown to reduce defensiveness. However, we did not expect the effect of self-affirmation to be contingent upon inflated selfesteem. This prediction is consistent with prior selfaffirmation research and also with TMT. Self-affirmation by means of avowing the importance of one's values should bolster one's worldview, thereby reinforcing the symbolic shield against death.
STUDY 1
The purpose of Study 1 was to determine whether selfaffirmation would eliminate worldview defense following MS. Some participants wrote a short narrative about an important value or characteristic (self-affirmation condition), and other participants wrote about a less important value (no-affirmation condition). Then, participants responded either to questions about their own mortality (MS condition) or to questions about dental pain (no-MS condition). After a short delay, all participants read and evaluated two essays. One essay espoused a pro-American view and the other an anti-American view. A host of studies has shown that MS leads to quite negative evaluations of the anti-American essay and positive evaluations of the pro-American essay (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990 Greenberg et al., , 2003 . We expected to replicate the typical worldview defense pattern unless participants had first self-affirmed.
Method PARTICIPANTS
Sixty-six students (18 men and 48 women) at Florida State University participated in the study in exchange for credit toward a course requirement. Data from 1 participant were excluded from analyses because the participant failed to follow instructions, leaving a final sample of 65 participants.
PROCEDURE
The study was conducted in a classroom in groups of 10 to 25 participants. The experimenter announced that participants would be responding to questionnaires about values, personality characteristics, and opinions about the United States. He then distributed a packet that contained all the materials for the experiment. After a demographic questionnaire, the next item in the packet had participants rank a list of 12 values and characteristics in order of personal importance (see Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000) . The list included the following values and personal characteristics: aesthetic appreciation, sense of humor, relations with family and friends, spontaneity, social skills, athletics, music ability or appreciation, neatness or tidiness, physical attractiveness, creativity, managerial skills, and romantic values.
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Affirmation manipulation. After ranking the values in order of importance, participants completed a brief writing assignment that composed the self-affirmation manipulation (see Cohen et al., 2000; Fein & Spencer, 1997) . Participants in the affirmation condition first indicated their most important value from the valueranking form and then wrote a brief essay explaining why the value is important to them and a time in their lives when it had been particularly important. Participants in the no-affirmation condition indicated their ninth-most-important value and wrote a brief essay describing why the value might be important to the average student. Participants were instructed to write for 5 minutes before moving on to the next item in the packet.
After the self-affirmation manipulation, participants completed the State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) . High self-esteem has been shown to negate MS effects (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997) , and so we included the self-esteem measure to determine whether the expected effects of self-affirmation on worldview defense may be due to increased self-esteem. Based on the patterns reported by Galinsky et al. (2000) , we did not expect changes in state self-esteem following the affirmation manipulation.
MS manipulation. Next, participants completed the MS manipulation or the dental-pain (control) manipulation. (Approximately 5 minutes elapsed between the self-affirmation manipulation and the MS or dental-pain manipulations.) Participants were asked to describe the emotions that the thought of their own death (dental pain) aroused in them and also to write about what would happen to them physically as they die (experience dental pain). The MS and dental-pain questions have been used in many previous studies of MS and terror management (for a review, see . Because the effects of this MS manipulation emerge under normal circumstances only after a short delay (Pyszczynski et al., 1999) , and because we wished simply to separate the manipulation from the primary dependent variable, participants filled out a 36-item pilot questionnaire about their emotion regulation ability between the MS manipulation and reading and reacting to the target essays.
The pro-and anti-American essays (see Arndt, Allen, & Greenberg, 2001 ) followed the emotion regulation questionnaire. Essay order was counterbalanced across participants. After reading an essay, participants were asked to evaluate the truth and validity of the essay and the likability, intelligence, and knowledgeability of the essay's author on 9-point scales. The summed evaluations of each essay served as the measures of favorability toward worldview-consistent and worldview-inconsistent opinions, respectively.
Thus, participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: no affirmation and no MS, no affirmation and MS, self-affirmation and no MS, and selfaffirmation and MS. We expected that participants in the MS condition who had not been self-affirmed would show the typical pattern of worldview defense, but that worldview defense would be attenuated among MS participants who had been self-affirmed. We made no predictions about self-affirmation and no MS participants, and the no affirmation and no MS condition served as a control group.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To determine whether MS led to worldview defense, and whether self-affirmation eliminated this tendency, we summed the five ratings of each essay and submitted those scores to a 2 (self-affirmation vs. no affirmation) × 2 (MS vs. dental-pain salience) × 2 (essay type: proAmerican or anti-American) mixed-factors ANOVA with essay type as a within-subjects factor. (Order of essay presentation had no main or interactive effects and so was excluded from this analysis.) We observed a marginal effect of MS, F(1, 61) = 3.08, p = .08, and a significant MS × Affirmation × Essay interaction, F(1, 61) = 6.81, p = .01.
To decompose the three-way interaction, we examined evaluations of the pro-U.S. and anti-U.S. essays separately. The results are presented in Table 1 . First, we compared nonaffirmed participants in the MS and dental-pain control conditions to determine whether worldview defense occurred after the MS manipulation. Indeed, MS participants gave more positive evaluations of the pro-U.S. essay, t(33) = 2.76, p = .01, and somewhat more negative evaluations of the anti-U.S. essay, t(33) = 1.70, p = .10, than dental-pain control participants, consistent with prior terror management research.
Our primary interest was whether self-affirmation would eliminate worldview defense after MS. It did. As can be seen in Table 1 , MS and dental-pain salience did not differentially affect evaluations of the pro-U.S. essay among participants who had been self-affirmed, t (28) = 0.76, p = .45. And affirmed participants were even somewhat more favorable toward the anti-U.S. essay after writing about mortality than after writing about dental pain, t(28) = 1.78, p = .09, representing a reversal of the typical MS effect. Furthermore, we compared affirmed and nonaffirmed participants in the MS condition and observed that self-affirmed participants evaluated the anti-U.S. essay less negatively than nonaffirmed participants, t(29) = 2.36, p = .03, whereas both groups evaluated the pro-U.S. essay equally favorably, t(29) = 0.02, p = .98. Thus, self-affirmation negated the tendency to derogate a worldview violator after MS.
In addition to finding that self-affirmation reduced derogation of a worldview violator after MS, we also observed a trend in the dental-pain conditions for affirmed participants to show more favorability than nonaffirmed participants toward the proworldview author, t(32) = 1.92, p = .06. This effect appears consistent with the idea that self-affirmation bolsters one's cultural worldview. Affirmation in the dental-pain conditions, however, did not differently affect evaluations of the antiworldview author, t(32) = 1.12, p = .27.
Recall that all participants completed the State SelfEsteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) after the selfaffirmation manipulation but before the MS manipulation. In this way, we were able to determine whether self-affirmation boosted self-esteem prior to the MS manipulation. This possibility is important to consider, because past research has shown that high self-esteem is associated with reduced worldview defense after MS (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). The t tests revealed that affirmed and nonaffirmed participants reported similar state self-esteem on all three subscales of the questionnaire and on the total state self-esteem score, all ts < 1. These patterns suggest the self-affirmation manipulation did not boost state self-esteem. Therefore, the reduction in worldview defense among self-affirmed participants was likely not due to increased explicit selfesteem after self-affirmation.
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In addition to assessing between-condition differences in self-esteem, we investigated the possibility that self-esteem moderated the MS by self-affirmation interaction. To make the data more manageable, we created a single measure of worldview bias by subtracting participants' antiworldview essay evaluations from their proworldview evaluations. We then regressed this worldview defense measure onto MS, self-affirmation, and state self-esteem. The three-way interaction did not approach significance, p > .50, indicating that state selfesteem measured after the affirmation manipulation did not moderate the observed worldview defense patterns.
In sum, MS led to vigorous worldview defense unless participants first had been self-affirmed. This pattern shows that self-affirmation may forestall typical terror management strategies for symbolic defense. Furthermore, the self-affirmation manipulation had a marginal effect on essay evaluation even when mortality had not been made salient. Specifically, self-affirmed participants tended to rate the pro-U.S. essay more positively than did nonaffirmed participants in the dental-pain control condition. This finding is consistent with the idea that self-affirmation bolsters faith in one's cultural worldview, although we had not predicted this specific effect. We leave it to future research to consider fully the effect of self-affirmation on attitudes toward one's worldview in the absence of self-threat. The main implication of Study 1 is that self-affirmation secures one's worldview in the face of MS and decreases the tendency to derogate others who criticize aspects of one's worldview. STUDY 2 In Study 2, we considered a mechanism by which affirming important values may have eliminated worldview defense following MS. Specifically, we assessed whether self-affirmation reduced the accessibility of death-related thoughts. If self-affirmation prior to MS reduced subsequent death-thought accessibility, then it is possible that reduced defensiveness after selfaffirmation was due to this reduction in death accessibility. Support for this position comes from work showing that when death thoughts are suppressed or otherwise minimized, the likelihood of worldview defense is also reduced. For example, immediately after an explicit MS induction, worldview defense is not typically observed. However, after a delay or a distraction from the MS induction, death-related thoughts show heightened cognitive activation. During this period, when death thoughts are not being actively suppressed or otherwise reduced, worldview defense becomes more prevalent (e.g., Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2000; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994) . In addition, research has shown that engaging in worldview defense after MS reduces death accessibility to baseline levels Greenberg, Arndt, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2001) . Therefore, in Study 2 we focused on the hypothesis that self-affirmation prior to MS reduces the accessibility of death-related thoughts after MS.
The view that self-affirmation helps to reduce the accessibility of death-related thoughts would be sup-
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PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN ported if after MS death thoughts were relatively less accessible among self-affirmed participants than among nonaffirmed participants. Thus, in Study 2 we repeated the self-affirmation manipulation from Study 1 and then gave all participants the MS manipulation. Instead of having participants evaluate essays, we gave them a measure of death-thought accessibility adapted from Greenberg et al. (1994) . We did not use both the worldview-related essays and the death accessibility measure in Study 2 because we reasoned, as did HarmonJones et al. (1997) , that the death accessibility measure may again make death salient, thereby influencing subsequent reactions to a worldview violator. We expected that self-affirmed participants would show relatively impoverished death-thought accessibility compared to nonaffirmed participants. We again measured state selfesteem after the affirmation manipulation to determine whether the expected affirmation effect may have been due to changes in self-esteem.
Method PARTICIPANTS
Fifty-four students (10 men and 43 women) at Florida State University participated in the study in exchange for credit toward a course requirement.
PROCEDURE
The study was conducted in a classroom in groups of 10 to 25 participants. The experimenter announced that participants would be responding to questionnaires about values and personality characteristics. He then distributed a packet that contained all the materials for the experiment. As in Study 1, the first item in the packet had participants rank a list of 12 values and characteristics in order of personal importance.
Affirmation manipulation. The affirmation manipulation involved writing about either the top-ranked value or a less important one from the ranked list and was identical to the affirmation procedure used in Study 1 (see also Cohen et al., 2000; Fein & Spencer, 1997) . Participants were instructed to write for 5 minutes before moving on to the next item in the packet.
After the self-affirmation manipulation, participants again completed the State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) . As in Study 1, we expected to find no effect of self-affirmation on state self-esteem. Next, all participants encountered the MS manipulation, which again asked them to think and write about their own eventual death. (We did not include the dental-pain control condition because we were interested in the effect of self-affirmation on death-related thoughts.) Approximately 5 minutes elapsed between the self-affirmation manipulation and the MS manipulation.
We again separated the MS manipulation from the target dependent variable by approximately 5 minutes because the effects of this explicit MS manipulation are strongest after a short delay. To accomplish the delay, after the MS questions participants performed a 20-item Cognitive Estimation Test (Fein, Gleeson, Bullard, Mapou, & Kaplan, 1998; Shallice & Evans, 1978) , which asked participants to estimate unknown quantities such as "How many seeds are there in a watermelon?" and "How much does a folding chair weigh?"
We chose a word-fragment completion task as our measure of death-thought accessibility. Using a measure adapted from Greenberg et al. (1994) , we presented participants with 25 word fragments. Six of the fragments could be completed with death-related words (skull, coffin, grave, dead, killed, and buried) , and the other 19 fragments could only be completed with neutral words unrelated to death (e.g., guess, sofa).
Thus, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: no affirmation and MS or selfaffirmation and MS. We expected that after MS, participants who had not been self-affirmed would show greater accessibility of death-related thoughts than selfaffirmed participants. This pattern would support the view that self-affirmation helps to reduce death-related thoughts following explicit MS.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To determine whether self-affirmation facilitated a reduction of death-related thoughts, we compared affirmed and nonaffirmed participants on the number of death-related word-fragment completions they generated. As expected, affirmed participants, (M = 1.21, SD = 0.90) furnished fewer death-related words than nonaffirmed participants (M = 1.96, SD = 1.57), t(52) = 2.20, p = .03.
We considered whether self-affirmation may have boosted state self-esteem, because increased self-esteem could have been responsible for the decreased accessibility of death-related thoughts (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997) . Again, affirmed and nonaffirmed participants did not differ on any of the three subscales or the total score on the State Self-Esteem Scale, all ts < 1, so that reduced death-thought accessibility was likely not due to self-esteem. In addition to assessing between-condition differences, we tested the possibility that self-esteem moderated the observed self-affirmation effect. To do this, we regressed the death-thought accessibility measure onto self-affirmation condition and state selfesteem. The interaction term did not approach significance, p > .70. Thus, we found no evidence that the reduction in death-thought accessibility after selfaffirmation was due to increased self-esteem. Study 2 provided solid support for the view that selfaffirmation facilitates the reduction of death-related thoughts. Only 5 minutes after the MS induction, participants who initially wrote about an important value showed a relatively weak level of activation of deathrelated thoughts compared to those who did not write about an important value. This pattern is consistent with the function ascribed to cultural worldviews in TMT: Worldviews provide a source of meaning and value and security in the face of insignificance and vulnerability, and thereby protect people from thoughts of death.
FOLLOW-UP STUDIES
As discussed in the introduction, prior research has shown that temporary increases in self-esteem reduce terror management defenses in a manner virtually identical to the self-affirmation effects documented in Studies 1 and 2. To further establish the role (or lack thereof) of self-esteem in the value-affirmation affects, we collected some additional data. When we measured state self-esteem immediately after the self-affirmation manipulation in Studies 1 and 2, no groupwide differences emerged. Yet, it is possible that the link from selfaffirmation to increased self-esteem takes time to develop, much like reminders of death trigger ego defense after a short delay or distraction (see also McGuire & McGuire, 1996) . Thus, we administered the value-affirmation task to a new sample of 27 undergraduate students, who reported their state self-esteem only after an intervening questionnaire (the same one we used after MS in Study 1). We found that the selfaffirmed (M = 77.93, SD = 11.73) and nonaffirmed participants (M = 70.92, SD = 14.04) reported similar levels of state self-esteem approximately 5 minutes after the affirmation task, F(1, 25) = 1.99, p = .17.
Next, we administered the affirmation manipulation to 41 other undergraduate students and had them complete the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1989) either immediately or after the filler questionnaire. Perhaps the Rosenberg Self-Esteem measure would be more sensitive to the esteem-boosting effects of self-affirmation than the state measure we had been using. Again, however, we found no differences in esteem as a function of self-affirmation condition, F(1, 37) = 0.13, presence of delay, F(1, 37) = 0.57, or their interaction, F(1, 37) = 0.13, all ps > .50.
These supplementary data support the view that selfaffirmation by thinking and writing about core values does not boost explicit self-esteem. Thus, reduced worldview defense (Study 1) and low death-thought accessibility (Study 2) after self-affirmation was likely not due to increased explicit self-esteem. More likely, affirming important values reduced MS effects because it reinforced participants' faith in their cultural worldviewthe sprawling shield against death anxiety.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In Study 1, we observed that self-affirmation before MS reduced derogation of a worldview violator after MS. In Study 2, we found that the accessibility of deathrelated thoughts was reduced when participants had affirmed an important value prior to thinking about their own death. Taken together, these studies suggest that self-affirmation reduces the need to derogate a worldview violator by keeping thoughts of death at bay.
Moreover, we found no evidence that self-affirmation boosted explicit self-esteem. Past research has shown that boosting self-esteem eliminates MS-instigated worldview defense (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997) , but affirming the self by upholding an important value appears to reduce worldview defense and death accessibility independently of self-esteem. As such, our findings complement past research showing that increased selfesteem alleviates MS-induced defensiveness: Both boosts to self-esteem and the active affirmation of one's worldview counteract typical reactions to MS.
These studies also attest to the central role of cultural worldviews in terror management mechanisms. Past research has shown that MS increases subsequent worldview defense, consistent with the notion that cultural worldviews are intimately tied to the management of death-related concerns ). In the current research, we found that bolstering one's worldview prior to MS reduced defensive reactions to a worldview violator. Thus, the present findings provide new support for the role of cultural worldviews in regulating responses to death. The function of worldviews is evident not just in the defense of one's worldview after death reminders but also in the affirmation of one's worldview before MS.
In addition to supporting the death-defying function of cultural worldviews, the current work begins to bridge TMT with self-affirmation theory. By considering the two theories in light of each other, perhaps the understanding of both theories and of psychological self-defense generally may be advanced.
For example, the present work highlights important differences in forms of self-affirmation that heretofore have not been specifically distinguished. In past research, self-affirmation has been operationalized in two main ways: as highly positive personal feedback or as thinking and writing about one's core values. Whereas past work has shown that self-affirmation via positive feedback boosts self-esteem (e.g., Fein & Spencer, 1997) , the present research carefully tracked self-esteem after value affirmation and found no hint of inflated esteem (see also Galinsky et al., 2000) . Thus, some types of self-affirmation may increase explicit self-esteem and others may not.
In our view, the different forms of self-affirmation have their positive effects through the two different routes to death defense posited by TMT, namely, selfesteem and faith in a cultural worldview. Some forms of self-affirmation, including positive personality feedback (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993) and self-evaluation maintenance processes such as basking in the success of close others (Hirt, Zillman, Erickson, & Kennedy, 1992; Tesser & Cornell, 1991) probably increase state self-esteem. However, selfaffirmation can be more specifically worldview oriented and thus less directly related to self-esteem. We manipulated self-affirmation in the present studies not by inducing people to think of themselves in a positive light but instead by directing participants to affirm the importance of preferred values and characteristics. That is, we did not tell our participants they were particularly good or worthy-we simply had them write about what was important to them, without evaluating their ideas and without asking them to evaluate themselves. As a result, they became less defensive in response to reminders of death, but they did not report increased self-esteem. Thus, the different forms of self-affirmation used most frequently in past research may function to reduce defensiveness in a manner consistent with the twocomponent anxiety buffer proposed by TMT, namely, through increased self-esteem or bolstered cultural worldviews.
According to TMT, self-esteem and cultural worldviews are closely linked because self-esteem must be based on a meaningful conception of reality-a cultural worldview. Worldviews provide the foundation from which self-esteem is derived. It seems likely that manipulating one of these constructs would affect the other in some shape or form. However, we found no evidence that a value-based self-affirmation reduced defensiveness by boosting explicit self-esteem. Perhaps nonconscious or implicit processes may have been responsible for reduced defensiveness after affirmation. Some researchers have suggested that self-affirmation protects against threats to self-integrity by boosting implicit mood (e.g., Tesser, 2001) . Consistent with this notion, Koole et al. (1999) found that the effect of selfaffirmation on control over ruminative thoughts was mediated by increased implicit positive affect, whereas explicit mood played little or no role in the process.
A perhaps related affective explanation has been implicated in MS effects. As in self-affirmation work, affect does not mediate MS effects. For example, little or no evidence linking explicit mood or physiological arousal to terror management defenses exists Arndt & Goldenberg, 2002; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989) . However, the potential for anxiety may play an important role in MS effects. Specifically, inducing people to believe they did not have the potential to experience anxiety (because they had taken a pill purported to block anxiety) eliminated MS-instigated worldview defense but did not alter explicit affective states (Greenberg et al., 2003) . Thus, the potential to experience anxiety, rather than actual anxiety, may mediate MS-instigated defensiveness.
Both MS and self-affirmation effects, then, may involve nonexplicit, affect-related processes. Applying this idea to the present studies, it is possible that selfaffirmation influenced implicit affect, either by increasing implicit positive affect and/or decreasing implicit negative affect, so that the observed reductions in worldview defense and death accessibility were mediated by such changes. Or perhaps self-affirmation reduced the potential for negative affect, which then reduced death accessibility and worldview defense. Future research on the role of nonconscious affect and the potential to experience affect in terror management and self-affirmation may clarify the implicit processes at work in ego defense and the pursuit of self-integrity.
In addition to suggesting links between the implicit processes underlying terror management defenses and self-affirmation, the present work also suggests a reason why self-integrity is so important to people. Whereas selfaffirmation theory proposes that we are very flexible in how we defend ourselves from threat in order to achieve self-integrity, TMT suggests the cause of the self-integrity motive is the human existential dilemma-awareness of mortality and the utter inability literally to escape it.
The notion that self-integrity can be affirmed in a number of ways (e.g., Tesser et al., 2000) underscores the notion that mortality concerns, too, can be met in a wide variety of ways. Worldviews are multifaceted and complex, and each facet of a worldview may offer a means of protection from death concerns. For example, any given worldview might sanction or esteem acts ranging from earning and killing to cooking and sharing. Simply put, the psychological threat of death is likely to be reduced by securing any number of parts within one's cultural worldview. From complex worldviews come varied ways to achieve and maintain value and self-esteem.
The many routes to self-affirmation imply flexibility in the ways people may deal with the problem of death. Indeed, this flexibility is perhaps at the forefront of an existential paradox. Our incredible cognitive capacities, and specifically our abilities to consider the future and to find meaning and self-integrity in even the bleakest circumstances, at once make possible the awareness of certain death and also may prevent that awareness from making life miserable. NOTES 1. Across Studies 1 and 2, 66% of the participants ranked "relations with friends and family" as the most important value or characteristic in their lives. We found no evidence that the specific value participants rated as the most important one influenced the observed selfaffirmation effects, consistent with prior research (e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983) .
2. To understand how participants responded to the selfaffirmation manipulation, we had two naïve coders read participants' value essays and rate them on three dimensions: the extent to which the value was personally important to the author, the extent to which the author described personally exemplifying the value, and the extent to which the authors evaluated themselves with respect to fulfilling or engaging in the value. In this way, we assessed whether the selfaffirmation procedure led participants to write about their values and/ or to write about self-evaluation and esteem-related concerns. All ratings were made on continuous scales from 0 (not at all) to 90 (extremely). The ratings correlated from r(65) = .44 to r(65) = .91, all ps < .01. We averaged the two ratings for each question together and compared the ratings for the self-affirmation essays to ones for the no-affirmation essays.
These ratings indicated that essays in the self-affirmation condition expressed a much higher degree of importance of the value to the self (M = 82.12, SD = 6.82) than the no-affirmation essays (M = 10.97, SD = 16.75), F(1, 63) = 473.18, p < .01. Furthermore, essays by the affirmed participants expressed a greater degree of personally exemplifying the value (M = 33.07, SD = 16.95) than essays by the nonaffirmed participants did (M = 1.61, SD = 5.05), F(1, 63) = 109.44, p < .01, though the degree of personal exemplification in both conditions was well below the midpoint of the rating scale. Finding that the affirmed participants wrote about exemplifying the value is perhaps not surprising given that these participants had been instructed to write about a time when their top-ranked value had played an important role in their lives. Finally, neither the self-affirmed (M = 1.00, SD = 2.20) nor nonaffirmed participants (M = 0.46, SD = 0.98) showed any sign of explicit self-evaluation in their essays, F(1, 63) = 1.74, p = .19.
In sum, these analyses indicate that affirmed participants wrote about a value that was extremely important to them personally, and occasionally discussed how they exemplified the value in their own lives. The degree of self-evaluation expressed in the essays was equally low in both groups. Thus, the self-affirmation essay was primarily an exercise in describing a cherished value and was to a lesser degree an exercise in explaining or evaluating how well one exemplified the value.
